[Published: Sunday March 08 2026]
 Iran chooses its new supreme leader
By Akhtar Makoii
LONDON, 08 March. - (ANA) - Iran’s clerics have chosen a new supreme leader, eight days after the death of Ali Khamenei.
The identity of the new leader has not been revealed, hinting at both fears of assassination and internal dispute in the floundering regime.
“This candidate has been reported to the leadership board of the Assembly of Experts and has been verified,” Amirreza Hedayati, representative of Khuzestan province in the Assembly of Experts.
The announcement confirms recent speculation that a new leader was being lined up in secret, potentially to protect him from US-Israeli strikes that have killed senior officials.
The Israeli military, meanwhile, said on Sunday it will pursue “every successor and every person who seeks to appoint a successor” for Mr Khamenei, suggesting strikes on civilian clerics.
The Assembly of Experts must now choose between revealing their new leader and making him and themselves an immediate assassination target or maintaining secrecy.
The silence could also suggest internal disagreements about the selection process itself, which requires resolution to avoid undermining the new leader’s legitimacy.
“In these difficult conditions, there are obstacles,” Mr Mirbaqeri said. “This work must be done carefully so that it is not subject to dispute and remains as a historical document.”
“An almost definite opinion has been reached and the majority view has formed,” he added, expressing hope that “obstacles” would be removed as soon as possible.
Ayatollah Abdullah Kiyvani, representative of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province in the Assembly, released a formal statement on Friday urging the leadership board to expedite the process.
The external pressure from senior ayatollahs indicates the delay has created an uncertainty not just politically but also religiously.
The intervention of senior clerics signals that the succession delay threatens the Islamic Republic’s religious authority, not just its political stability.
It reveals a critical pressure point: Iran’s military is fighting without a commander-in-chief. And it can continue without a supreme authority.
New IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi faces the challenge of prosecuting warfare and preventing civil war without clear political authority directing strategy.
The longer this vacuum persists, the more it empowers military commanders to make independent decisions that could either escalate the conflict beyond political control or pursue strategies that contradict what civilian leadership eventually decides.
But the deeper problem is how Iran’s system actually functions without a supreme leader at the top.
The Islamic Republic is not a unitary state with a single chain of command.
It is a complex web of power centres - the IRGC, the regular military, the presidency, the judiciary, the clerical establishment, intelligence services, the Basij militia - all with overlapping jurisdictions, rival interests, and independent capabilities.
The supreme leader’s essential function is not just symbolic religious authority but practical political arbitration: when these institutions disagree, he decides.
When they pursue conflicting agendas, he imposes coherence. When one overreaches, he restrains it.
Without that arbiter, Iran’s system defaults to “fire at will” - each power centre pursuing its own interpretation of national interest without coordination or restraint.
The IRGC Navy can claim it struck the USS Abraham Lincoln while the regular Navy issues different statements.
The foreign ministry can signal openness to Omani mediation while the IRGC threatens that enemies will have “no security anywhere in the world.”
President Massoud Pezeshkian can apologise to neighbouring countries for strikes, while the IRGC spokesman declares any base used for attacks is a legitimate target regardless of which country hosts it.
The military dimension is most dangerous. Different commanders can make different strike decisions without centralised approval.
Iran’s system was designed to concentrate ultimate authority in the supreme leader precisely to prevent this fragmentation.
Until the clerics announce him and he exercises actual authority, Iran operates as a collection of institutions pursuing incompatible strategies while fighting a war against militarily superior enemies.
A supreme leader would provide what Iran needs right now: unity of command, clarity of strategy, and authority to make decisions without endless consultation.
Most critically, a supreme leader could negotiate with credibility.
The Association of Islamic Iranian Academics warned that delay carries “irreparable consequences” and plays into the hands of “Western-influenced internal groups” seeking to remove velayat-e faqih [guardianship of the jurist] from Iran’s constitution.
The academics called on Assembly members to “introduce the third leader of the Islamic Revolution as soon as possible” so “the noble nation of Iran can pledge allegiance with peace of mind to the deputy of Imam Mahdi and guardian of Muslims who will continue the path of our martyred Imam.”
Mr Mirbaqeri’s reference to “obstacles” suggests the Assembly has not resolved this dilemma, despite claiming consensus has been reached.
Whether these obstacles are external (security threats) or internal (disputes about the selection or process) will determine whether Iran emerges from this crisis with its system intact or fundamentally transformed. - (ANA) -
AB/ANA/08 March 2026 - - -
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