By Nacho Sánchez Amor

 

BRUSSELS, 18 March. - (ANA) - The latest litmus test for the EU, caused by the regional conflict provoked by the unlawful military intervention in Iran by the US and Israel, offers a possibility to revise an aspect of EU foreign policy that risks being overlooked among the geopolitical and security considerations: the silent mutation altering in practice the functioning of EU foreign policy as designed in the treaties. 

 

This topic, which I have been addressing since 2022 in debates, articles and written questions, is finally gaining traction in media and political debate, and refers to an ongoing undercurrent that dates back, at least, to the first von der Leyen European Commission (2019-2024).

 

The EU sought to solve Henry Kissinger´s apocryphal question (‘Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?’) when it equipped itself with a high representative for foreign affairs and security policy and vice-president of the European Commission, at the helm of a European External Action Service (EEAS), to address a perceived diplomatic gap.

 

This ‘double-hatted’ role aimed to act as a bridge between EU foreign and security policy, being an intergovernmental competence, and the ‘community method’. 

 

Nonetheless, von der Leyen´s first “geopolitical commission” started to exploit venues for action with regards to external relations.

 

The treaties’ vague provisions on external representation of the EU allowed for a conveniently interpretative legal framework for the president of the commission to incur in, precisely, representing the EU beyond commission competence.

 

It happened during geopolitical crises, such as Ukraine or Gaza, but also in apparently more regular, usual diplomatic interactions, such as the so-called “sofagate”.

 

 

 

 

During her second mandate, von der Leyen has maintained this expansionist behaviour to the detriment of Council and EEAS.

 

Some noteworthy examples include the ambitious rearrangement of DG NEAR into DG MENA (with a geographical scope that includes from the Maghreb to the Gulf); handling over to commissioner Maroš Šef?ovi? all aspects of EU relations with the UK (not exclusively trade); the proposal for the creation of a second intelligence cell directly under her remit (rivalling with the existing one in the EEAS); or the brazen participation of the commission in the inaugural session of Donald Trump´s Board of Peace — without a mandate from EU member states. 

 

More recently, von der Leyen´s flurry of “digital diplomacy” after the US-Israel strikes on Iran on 28 February is very hard to ignore.

 

In the span of a day, she publicly informed MEPs of conversations with eight foreign leaders, as well as with three EU countries — greatly overdoing communications by both the president of the European Council (António Costa) and the high representative (Kaja Kallas).

 

And, more blatantly, she announced the convening of a “Security College” — a new commission format announced last year with unclear mandate, scope, or capacities, that seems to duplicate the Political and Security Committee, mandated by the treaties to contribute to the shaping and implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), chaired by the EEAS.

 

 

 

 

The underlying question to this overreaching activity of the European Commission should not only be directed at von der Leyen, but more importantly, to the EU member states that gather in the council.

 

Why are they allowing such a clear encroachment of an exclusive member states’ competence, that goes beyond interpretations of EU external representation? 

 

One good explanation could be the financing of EU external action.

 

Contrary to national systems, where the attribution of the competence precedes its budgeting, the EU is reversing in practice that logic.

 

In the face of the chronic underfunding of the EU foreign affairs service, the commission is de facto assuming, by means of funding, external action competences to the detriment of the EEAS (while also subjecting it to a growing financial dependency).

 

Since this financial operation does not affect member states — that are not demanding more money from previously allocated contributions —they may be inadvertently buying into this new framework for EU external action.

 

Besides explanations for this phenomenon, my point is that we need to decide, in a transparent and democratic manner, whether we want an institutional change, including vesting more foreign policy capacities and powers in the commission.

 

This change could be more or less positive, but it requires a legal and constitutional debate and process that must respect the democratic accountability prerogatives that the parliament exerts over the commission.

 

Because this change cannot happen as it is happening: in the dark, with step-by-step, silent moves by the commission. It is unacceptable to fall into this fait accompli dynamic.

 

Finally, I turn once again to the council: member states, which are responsible for having allowed the commission to operate in this way for years, must react.

 

And they should also address the issue of the underfunding of the EEAS, which is, after all, their instrument and counterweight to this practice.   - (ANA) - 

 

AB/ANA/18 March 2026  - - -